Strong mapping is only required if the certificate authenticates a user or device against AD. NPS does it this way and thus requires the strong mapping, but all other NACs that I know do not require a mapping of certificates to AD entities and thus require no strong mapping and also neither a SAN URI nor SID extension. IMHO, NPS' approach is not well suited for modern environments with (some) cloud-only devices or users.
Therefore, I think ISE & Co. do not need to add support for the strong mapping. Having a valid certificate is enough to get into the network in their case, without an explicit mapping to an AD entity. You still have the certificate properties for auditing and can revoke a certificate if a specific user or device shouldn't get into the network anymore. This way, you also don't need to put the CA certificate in the NTAuth Store anymore, so they cannot be used for AD authentication. NPS requires the NTAuth and this exposes one more potential attack vector, as a stolen certificate does not only grant access to the network, but can also be used to impersonate an AD user or device.